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In rfhe S11preme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
D~LE GILBERT LOPEZ, 
Respondent, 
Appellant, 
Case No. 
11272 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Dale Gilbert Lopez, appeals from 
u conviction in the Seventh Judicial District Court, 
-:::arbon County, State of Utah, for the crime of sec-
A1d degree burglary. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged by information with 
:he crime of burglary in the second degree. Al-
:hough appellant demanded a jury trial, he subse-
lUently requested that the jury be discharged and 
'ne matter was heard March 7, 1968, by the Honor-
~:;le Henry Ruggeri, Seventh Judicial District, and 
';;pellant was found guilty. Sentence was imposed 
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March 15, 1968, confining the appellant in the Utai_ 
State Prison for a term as provided by law of nc:-
less than one nor more than twenty years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment o 
the Seventh Judicial District Court should be af-
firmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the fo: 
lowing statement of facts as being more in keepinCJ 
with the rule that evidence will be reviewed on ap-
peal in a light most favorable to the trial court's de-
termination. 
At approximately 3:30 a.m. on the mormnq ,-
Saturday. January 27, 1968, Duane Jensen, one c: 
the state's witnesses, observed a 1957 Ford four-due 
sedan coast to a stop across the road from the Betr 
Buy Market, located in Price, Utah (T. 78-79). II~ 
watched as the occupant left the car, crossed thf 
street and, while looking back over his shoulde 
scanned the immediate vicinity (T. 79). After cross-
ing the street, the individual, wearing a dark knec-
length coat_. entered the parking area of the st( 1I' 
(T. 80). Jensen watched for ten minutes, then pr:: 
pared to retire. l-:Iowever, he notified police to chcc.-
the store when he noticed that the car was gonP. 
Patrolman Glenn Peterson arrived at apprc 
mately 4:22 a.m. and discovered that a store v 
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do·N had been broken (T. 85). He then notified the 
storeowner, Charles Bezvack and, while awaiting 
the arrival of the owner, he noticed that the door at 
the rear of the store was unlocked (T. 87). 
When Mr. Bezy0ck arrived at about 4:30 a.m., 
he and the officer entered the store and the owner 
discovered that his cash box containing approxi-
mately $84 in rolls of quarters, dimes, nickels and 
pennies was missing (T. 92). Insufficient fund checks 
left in said box were also gone. Bezyack noticed that 
:he cover over the meat counter had been disturbed 
(T. 96). The following morning, a clerk informed Mr. 
Bezyack that several cartons of cigarettes were miss-
ing (T. 95). 
About 8:00 p.m. Saturday evening, January 27, 
1968, appellant was driving a 1957 Ford four-door 
sedan when, in attempting to pass another car, he 
hit an ice spot and skidded off the road. He was then 
1.:iken by a motorist to the Sheriff's Office where 
the appellant submitted to an alcohol test (T. 31). 
Subsequently, Deputy Sheriff Charles Semken, 
Jr., spoke with the appellant and advised him of his 
~onstitutional rights linder the Miranda decision. 
Appellant chose to converse with the deputy (T. 41). 
The deputy asked appellant where he was living, 
;f the officers could inspect the room, and where the 
~eys to the room were at that time. Appellant said 
:he deputy could 1001: in his room, told him where 
·+ '1ATas and where he could find the keys (T. 42). 
Subsequently, Charles Bezyack and Deputy 
:is-riff Keith Hansen went to appellant's motel room. 
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While there they found, between the mattress dr. 
the box spr:ngs, eight cartons of cigarettes. In 
closet hidden under some clothes and a cardbo,1E 
box they found rolls of qlJarters, nickels, dimes anr 
pennies (T. 44). They then started for Price from Wsi 
lington where the appellant's motel was loca\e6. 
About a half mile west of Wellington they found ths 
cash box lying alonqside the road. By the cash boY ' 
was the tray to the box and a bill from the Betr-Bm· 
Market (T. 45). 
The deputy and Mr. Bezyack then went back le 
the sheriff's office. The deputy spoke to appellwt 1 
telling him what thev had discovered. Appellan: 
asked if there was some way he could pay for the 
things (T. 45). Later Mr. Bezyack came into the roorr, 
The appellant said, "Charlie, I am sorry." He said. 
"I would like to pay you for all the damages. I can 
pay you as soon as I get my income tax check 
back." (T. 46). 
Appellant was asked about the checks and he 
said he thought that he had thrown them out n.L 
together (T. 46). These checks were subsequently 
found. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT WAS ARRESTED FOR GOOl 1 
CAUSE ALTHOUGH WITHOUT A WARRANT ANP 
THE SUBSEQUENT SEARCH WAS INCIDENTAL 'f(' 
A LAWFUL ARREST. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-3 (1953) outlines tl"I? 
5 
:uirernents for arrest Vlithout a warrant in part as 
'.dlows: 
(2) When the person arrested has committed a 
felony, ulthough not in his presence. 
(3) Vilhen 3 felony has in fact been committed, 
and he has reci.rnnable cause for believing the per-
son arrested to have committed it. 
( 4) On a charge. made upon reasonable caase, of 
the commission of a felony by the person arrested. 
(5) At night, when there is a reasonable cause to 
believe that he has committed a felony. 
Although the appellant voluntarily appeared at 
1:te Sheriff's Office in connection with the automo-
bile incident and submitted to an alcohol test which 
:,1dicated that he was not intoxicated, this does not 
::impel an inescapable conclusion that he was en-
,t!led to be released and that his detention was un-
'.::wvful. In fact, a felony had been committed in the 
·-:;mmunity Jess than t-vventy-four hours before the 
1ppellant was questioned at the Sheriff's Office and 
',.s car involved in the accident fit the vehicle de-
'~·nbed by the witness to the burglary, Duane Jen-
,sn. These two factors are sufficient to lead to a 
:-:'.)sitive conclusion regarding the existence of prob-
'cle or reasonable cause as required by the statute 
=1ted above. Contrary to the assertion in the appel-
~nt' s brief that the arrest occurred in connection 
·:1th the accident, it is apparent that the identity of 
'.'(' 'JGhicles alone was sufficient to establish a firm 
,.-,': between the appellant and the felony in ques-
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tion, thereby confirming the legality of the arresr 
procedure. 
The appellant's brief cites the case of Henry v. 
U.S .. 361 U.S. 98 (1959) to support the contention tha. 
the detention of the appellant under the circum-
stances was illegal and a violation of his rights un-
der Utah Const. art. I, § 7 and the U.S. Const. arneno 
XIV. However, the Court pointed out in that case: 
Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances 
known to the officer warrant a prudent man in be-
lieving that the offense had been committed .... 
And while a search without warrant is, within 
limits, permissible if incident to a lawful arrest, if 
an arrest without a warrant is to support an inci-
dental search, it must be made with probable cause. 
Henry v. U.S.~ supra, at P.102-3. 
In the instant case, the identity of the vehicles 
was sufficient to warrant a conclusion as to prob· 
able or reasonable cause both as to the arrest anc' 
l. 
subsequent search. To conclude otherwise wou10 
unduly hinder the police investigatory activity, par 
ticularly where evidence has already been un· 
earthed suggesting the existence of articles direct 
ly related to the incident in question. 
Furthermore, the search in this instance w0 ~ 
clearly incidental to the arrest in accordance witr 
the test established in Agnello v. United States, 269 
U.S. 20 (1925) and reiterated in Stoner v. California, 
376 U.S. 483 (1964), which in essence requires th2' 
the search be substantially contemporaneous v:it!-
the arrest and confined to the immediate vicin1' 
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Of more importance, in the case of McDonald v. 
United States. 307 F.2.d 272 (10th Cir. 1962), the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's 
finding that the appellant, while in custody, gave 
his free and voluntary consent to the search of his 
automobile. Despite the existence of conflicting 
testimony on the issue of consent, the appellate 
court upheld the denial of the Motion to Suppress, 
holding that it was unable to conclude as a matter 
of law that such a finding was erroneous. In a simi-
lar instance, it was held that the relinquishing of car 
keys by the accused was tantamount to consent to 
the subsequent search of the vehicle. Robinson v. 
United States, 325 F. 2d 880 (5th Cir. 1964). Further-
more, there is little evidence of intimidation or coer-
cion which would initiate the volition of the re-
quired consent, which was given in this case both 
'Nith respect to the automobile and the motel room. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT KNO,VINGLY AND PURPOSE-
FULLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL AS 
REQUIRED BY STATUTE, I.E., IN OPEN COURT AND 
ENTERED IN THE MINUTES. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2 (1953) provides: 
Issues of fact must be tried by a jury, but in all 
cases except where a sentence of death may be im-
posed trial by jury may be waived by the defendant. 
Such waiver shall be made in open court and en-
tered in the minutes. 
The effect of this section is to abrogate the com-
'·1cm l::i.w rule that '.:me accused of a felony may not 
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waive his right to a jury trial. In the case of Barlow 
et al. v. Young, Sheriff, 108 Utah 523, 161 P.2d 927 
(1945), the Utah Supreme Court held that the pc:t: 
tioners had effectively waived their right to a. jury 
trial although the stipulations were signed by coun 
sel and not the defendants since they were presen'. 
and fully aware of the implications of the waiver 
and the contents of the stipulations. In a concurring 
opinion, Chief Justice Larsen commented concern-
ing the role of counsel under these circumstanceE 
as follows: 
... may counsel, in open court and in the presence 
of his cJient, waive a jury or enter a stipulation as 
to evidence which is binding on the client? That 
this question calls for an affirmative answer seems 
clear. In the conduct and trial of a lawsuit, the at-
torney is not a servant or mere agent of his client. 
He is the general manager, the expert director of 
the business in hand. It is his judgment and not the 
judgment or whim of the client that controls the 
litigation. The attorney is the agent or helper of the 
court. His duty to the court is superior to that due 
the client. His obligation runs to the public as well 
as to the individiual. He has no moral right to pro-
long trials and litigation by trifling or dilatory tac-
tics or resort to the subterfuge of trying to wear out 
his opponent just to suit the whim or anger of his 
client .... 
The statements of the court in this regard aT'? 
particularly relevant to the instant case wherP tho: 
appellant asserts that he was unconstitutionally dt:: 
prived of his right to a jury trial. The record ir::-
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:::ates considerable conflict as to the defendant's 
statements regarding the presence of a jury (See 
R. 70). Under these circumstances it was not un-
reasonable and indeed was essential for counsel to 
act on his behalf. Furthermore, it is within the trial 
:::cmrt' s discretion to discharge the jury pursuant to 
the submission of stipulations as to issues of fact. 
POINT III 
THE ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY AS TO APPEL-
1,ANT'S POSSESSION OF STOLEN ARTICLES WAS 
PERMISSIBLE AND EVEN IF IT WAS ERRONEOUS, 
IT DID NOT AFFECT THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF 
THE DEFENDANT. 
As is noted in appeJlant' s brief, the generally 
;1/Tepted rule precludes the admission in a criminal 
trial of evidence of other similar offenses. This prop-
osition was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Leek, 85 Utah 531, 34 P.2d 1091 (1934), where 
the court reversed and remanded a forgery convic-
t1on after the trial court admitted into evidence, over 
objection, two other checks supposedly endorsed 
CJ.t the same time as the check in question but pay-
:ible at different times and places. However, one of 
the instanc6s in which the exception to the exclu-
sionary rule comes into play occurs when the evi-
1ence sought to be introduced is intimately con-
'lC!cted with trial issues. 
Evidence of possession of other prnpe;.'t:v by Cle L1e-
fendant may be admissible because it is found in 
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such close connection with the property involved 
in the cri!ne charged that evidence regarding it is 
inseparable from evidence of possession of the prop-
erty charged in the indictment, or because the fact 
appears incidentally and naturally in showing the 
whole t:·ansaction conci:orning the property involved 
in the pros~cution. Evidence of the possession of 
other property than that involved in the prosecu-
tioi1 is frequently admitted for the purpose of show-
ing the intent of the defendant in doing the partic-
ular act chargc'd az'.1inst him as a crime, or to prove 
scienter, or guilty or criminal knowledge with re-
spect to the crime charged, or as tending to show 
that such crim9 was n part of a system of criminal 
acts. (Emphasis added.) 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§ ~90 at P. 336 ( 1967). 
Under the circumstances of this particular casG 
it was not unreasonable for Officer Semken to ques 
tion the appellant concerning the latter's possession 
of the fruits of other recent and unsolved crimes. 
There was no abuse of discretion by the trial cou~: 
1n admitting such evidence during cross ex:amino 
tion where counsel for the appellant had previous]-, 
opened the subject of the conversation between the 
appellant c.nd Semken on direct examination. Thi~ 
appears to have been the basis for admitting thF 
evidence in question since, when appellant's cot'r. 
sel registered h!s obiection. the court stated, " ... \f<, 
objection is overruJed. You opened up this subjc:c· 
The objection is overruled." (R. 35). 
Furthermore, th8 fact that the evidence in qut:":c 
tion was msntion0d at only one point durinq fh 
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ria.1 is indicative of its appearance " ... incidental-
:y a.nd naturally in showing the whole trans-
c_;ctiun .... " 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence, supra. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 ( l953) provides: 
After hearing an qppeal the court must give judg-
ment without regard to errors or defects which do 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. If 
error has been committed, it shall not be presumed 
to have resulted in prejudice. The court must be 
satisfied that it has that effect before it is war-
ranted in reversing the judgment. 
It is submitted that even if the admission of such 
Jral testimony was erroneous, it did not affect the 
'substantial rights" of the appellant. State v. Ro-
mero. 42 Utah 46, 128 P. 530 (1912); State v. Estes, 52 
Utah 572, 176 P. 271 (1918). 
CONCLUSION 
Tho facts in the instant case amply demonstrate 
::1:it the trial court acted properly in finding appel-
. .:Jnt guilty of the crime charged. The legal claims of 
"rror on which the appellant relies for reversal are 
',\hout merit. The arrest, search and seizure pro-
?rJures followed in the instant case were made with 
::,· ~'bable cause and in the belief that the appellant 
committed the burglarv in question. Waiver of 
·,;_ )ury trial by appellant's counsel through stipula-
:--i:.; Clf fact was appropriate under the circum-
12 
stances and, therefore, this court should affirm ths 
District Court's judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY, JR 
Attorney General 
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
